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Abstract:  
In this paper we compare the welfare effects of unemployment insurance (UI) with an 
universal basic income (UBI) system in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to 
employment. Both policies provide a safety net in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. While 
the unemployment insurance program should do a better job at protecting the 
unemployed, it suffers from moral hazard and substantial monitoring costs, which may 
threaten its usefulness. The universal basic income, which is simpler to manage and 
immune to moral hazard, may represent an interesting alternative in this context. We 
work within a dynamic equilibrium model with savings calibrated to the United States for 
1990 and 2011, and provide results that show that UI beats UBI for insurance purposes 
because it is better targeted towards those in need. 
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Introduction
In recent years, universal basic income policies have been proposed by economists and po-
litical scientists as credible alternatives to existing social programs. The idea is simple:
Provide citizens with a minimum allowance without means-testing that would give everyone
the means to live on a basic level with dignity. A recent example is a constitutional initiative
launched in October 2013 in Switzerland.1
Advocates of universal basic income [UBI] can be found all over the political spectrum and
in many academic circles, according to the “rainbow coalition” image provided by Anthony
Atkinson (Atkinson, 1995). From economists James Meade, Milton Friedman, James Tobin,
and Anthony Atkinson to philosophers John Rawls and Philippe Van Parijs, the concept
has received much support over the years, for a wide range of reasons: alleviating poverty,
simplifying the social protection system, providing additional freedom, etc.
James Meade was one of the first to voice the idea of a social dividend back in 1935
(Meade, 1935, 1989). Juliet Rhys-Williams in the 1940s and then Milton Friedman in the
1960s reintroduced the idea in the form of a negative income tax (Rhys-Williams, 1943;
Friedman, 1968), and Tobin offered the concept of a credit income tax (Tobin, 1966; Tobin,
Pechman, & Mieszkowski, 1967).2 Friedman’s interest in UBI was motivated by the fact
that free markets did not guarantee that everyone could meet basic needs. Seeking ways for
society to correct for this result, he saw efficiency gains in the simplicity of the program.
Milton Friedman argued that there were too many problems with existing social programs
and that they should be replaced by a unique program, i.e. a negative income tax (Frank,
2006). Rawls (1971) agreed with Friedman on that point.
UBI programs vary in scope according to the perspective of their advocates. While
Philippe Van Parijs highlights its universal, unconditional aspect (Van Parijs, 1991), An-
1See, for instance, Mu¨ller (2013). This debate has contributed to similar questionning in North America
and in Europe (Lowrey, 2013; Van Parijs, 2013, for example).
2Although the UBI policy and the negative income tax can theoretically achieve the same result, there
are slight differences between the two: the negative income tax is distributed at the end of the fiscal year
to those capable of filling a tax return. Technically, UBI is paid upfront to all adult members of society.
Tobin’s credit income tax is quite close to the negative income tax, yet it may differ in its administration. It
inspired the “Demogrant” proposal of the US democratic presidential candidate George McGovern (defeated
in 1971 by Richard Nixon). It should be noted Martin Luther King also promoted the idea of a guaranteed
income for all Americans to reduce poverty (King, 1967).
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thony Atkinson views it rather as a participation income program (Atkinson, 1995). Van
Parijs (2000, 2004) thinks of the basic income as a way to provide everyone with the same
minimum income, but also as a way to avoid much of the moral hazard of other social pro-
grams. For him, UBI certainly reduces poverty, but it is also motivated by ethical reasons:
beneath this premise is a sense of social justice and the social reponsibility of a free state for
its members. For freedom to be meaningful, a free society must provide everyone with the
proper means to exert that freedom (Van Parijs, 1991).3 Herbert Simon also made a state-
ment in favor of a UBI policy, praising its justice while highlighting its possible disincentives
(Simon, 2000).
Alaska provides one version of basic income, through the Permanent Fund passed in 1976
(Alaska Constitution, Article IX, Section 15), with the very special case of sharing dividends
from an Alaskan natural resource, oil. Some field experiments, close to what a basic income
could be, were tried in the 1970s in the United States and Canada; see Harris (2005) for a
review.
In the economic literature, UBI is sometimes viewed as a way to help the unemployed
(Van der Linden, 2002; Lehmann, 2003; Van der Linden, 2004). Dre`ze (1993) shows for
instance that a basic income policy could be a good alternative to the reduction of social se-
curity contributions (RSSC) if associated with some deregulation of the labor market. There
is currently an important debate in Europe on the appropriateness of using UBI as a way
to overcome poverty and to replace the existing grant systems (see Vanderborght (2013), for
a summary of the political arguments in favor of this system). In a very interesting paper,
Van der Linden (2004) uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the effect of
UBI policies on welfare and employment. He shows that the UBI policy reduces the equilib-
rium unemployment rate in an environment with risk-neutral agents. The actual comparison
between UBI and unemployment insurance [UI] in a framework with self-insurance via sav-
ings, moral hazard, and monitoring costs, in the spirit of Friedman’s criticism, has not been
investigated.
In this paper, we focus on the welfare comparison between a UBI policy and the often-
3In this sense, basic income can meet the requirement of justice and freedom advocated by Sen (Sen,
1980, 2006, 2009), which implies that people should be given sufficient capabilities to exercise their individual
responsibility and choose what they want to do with them. We should note a controversy between Rawls
and Van Parijs on the unconditionality of basic income. Although he considers some leisure to be a basic
need, Rawls (1993) argued that a social policy should not subsidize those whose life is devoted to leisure.
The example used by both authors is that of surfers in Malibu, California.
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criticized yet resilient UI. The latter does clearly suffer from several serious flaws, such
as tax distortion, the lower savings it generates, moral hazard, and disincentives to work.
Designed to offer temporary support to those affected by involuntary unemployment, UI
requires important monitoring of beneficiaries. Do they actually look for employment with
reasonable effort? Krueger & Mueller (2010) find that the time spent searching is on average
a few minutes a day. Do they refuse offers and still try to collect unemployment benefits?
Monitoring makes the management of an unemployment insurance program costly. In the
state of Oregon, for example, the cost of running the unemployment agency is about $500 per
unemployed person per year. This is the type of cost some want to avoid with this simpler
policy. Furthermore, since monitoring is never perfect, a proportion of individuals who refuse
employment offers manage to go undetected. Moreover, it is common in some countries to
disguise quits as lay-offs (Barros, Corseuil, & Foguel, 1999). Hence, the burden of financing
an unemployment insurance system can be substantial. This is another type of social cost,
which Van Parijs (1991) suggests should matter when comparing the two policies. Clearly,
those who contribute most to this burden are workers who may enjoy being rewarded by a
basic transfer.
A UBI program is indeed much simpler to manage than a UI program, even if it still
generates a tax distortion. Moral hazard, in the sense just described, is not an issue with
a basic income policy because workers and unemployed agents receive the same amount. It
provides no a priori disincentive to look for work, unless set much too high. It may be socially
desirable, therefore, to substitute a properly chosen UBI program for the UI program.4
We test this conjecture within a dynamic model with heterogeneous agents facing em-
ployment lotteries and borrowing constraints, which we calibrate to the United States’ labor
market dynamics. Our results indicate that, in spite of its many drawbacks, the UI in-
stitution is socially very robust to the introduction of a UBI policy. It takes empirically
implausible monitoring costs and shirking success probabilities for the optimal basic income
policy to dominate the unemployment insurance policy. Also, combining unemployment
insurance and universal basic income does not present a socially desirable alternative for
reasonable values of our model parameters.
4Another paper that quantitatively investigates the effects of UBI policies is Van der Linden (2002).
The author verifies how UBI affects unemployment in a dynamic general equilibrium model of a unionized
economy and shows that some basic income schemes lower the steady-state unemployment rate; in this
context, the dynamic adjustment of such reforms can be Pareto-improving.
4
1 The Model
We work in an environment that mimics the major labor market shocks experienced by
both the employed and unemployed. Our model features a job-market lottery a` la Hansen
& I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and Pallage & Zimmermann (2001), and a dynamic, discrete-time
economy with a continuum of infinitely lived agents of unit measure. These face consumption
and labor decisions in the context of borrowing constraints and social policies in the form of
a universal basic income and/or an unemployment insurance policy. The model is presented
below in a generic way, allowing for all possibilities (UI, UBI, or both).
Model agents are heterogeneous in two important dimensions. At any given time t, they
may or may not have a job opportunity and they may have accumulated different amounts of
savings to self-insure beyond what the existing policy mix offers against employment shocks.
Employment opportunities occur randomly. Let st ∈ {0, 1} denote the result for a specific
agent of the employment lottery at the beginning of period t. It takes value 1 if the agent
is offered a job (or the continuation of a job) and value 0 otherwise. The outcomes of the
employment lottery follow a Markov process with probabilities p(st|st−1). When observing
that he has the chance to work (st = 1), the agent decides whether or not to accept the offer.
The agent who elects to work is paid an income normalized to 1.
While model agents face a borrowing constraint, they have access to a storage technology
that allows them to accumulate assets to smooth consumption against potential future ad-
verse employment shocks. We call mt the asset available to the agent at time t. The budget
constraint of an agent in period t can be written as
mt+1 + ct = mt + y
d
t , (1)
where ct is the agent’s consumption at time t, mt+1 is his future asset, and y
d
t is his disposable
income. Normalizing an agent’s productivity to 1, we can write the disposable income as
one of three possible types depending on the work status and eligibility for unemployment
benefits:
ydt =

(1− τ)(1 + ω) if he works
(1− τ)(θ + ω) if he collects UI benefits
(1− τ)ω otherwise
(2)
with τ a proportional income tax rate, θ the fraction of labor income an eligible unemployed
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agent receives as income replacement from the UI agency, and ω a UBI. The UBI policy is
characterized by a constant periodic transfer to all agents.
Eligibility for unemployment benefits is restricted to those agents without a job offer. The
unemployment insurance agency’s monitoring of applicants, however, may be imperfect. We
model moral hazard by allowing a fraction pi of agents who refuse job offers to succeed in
fraudulently collecting unemployment benefits.
Unemployment insurance and basic income transfers are financed with a proportional
income tax. The endogenous tax rate, τ , is such that the government balances its budget.
Unlike the case for basic income, which is given to all, with no questions asked and no strings
attached, there is a cost to the provision of unemployment benefits. The necessary – albeit
imperfect – monitoring of applicants involves a management cost of the unemployment in-
surance agency. Let λ represent the management cost per unemployed per period, regardless
of the size of benefits. This cost is taken into account in the government’s budget balancing
rule below.
Individual agents have preferences over consumption, ct, and leisure, lt, every period,
which can be represented by the following utility function:
u(ct, lt) =
[c1−σt lσt ]
1−γ − 1
1− γ , (3)
where γ is the degree of risk aversion of the agent and σ is the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure. We assume for simplicity that labor is indivisible, i.e., an
agent works either a fixed proportion h¯ of his unit time endowment or does not work at all.
Agents are infinitely lived. They maximize the expected present-value of infinite streams
of utility, subject to the above budget constraint:
max E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt), (4)
with β ∈ [0, 1), a discount factor.
This problem is recursive and can be written in the form of a Bellman equation (Bellman,
1954), where we drop time subscripts and use prime symbols for future states. The binary
decision to work is denoted by x, with x = 1 if a job offer is accepted and 0 otherwise. For
an agent with asset m and a job offer (s = 1), the Bellman equation is therefore:
V (s = 1,m) =
6
max
x
{
xmax
m′
[
u((1− τ)(1 + ω) +m−m′, 1− h¯) +∑
s′
p(s′|1)V (s′,m′)
]
+(1− x)(1− pi) max
m′
[
u((1− τ)ω +m−m′, 1) +∑
s′
p(s′|1)V (s′,m′)]
]
+(1− x)pimax
m′
[
u((1− τ)(θ + ω) +m−m′, 1) +∑
s′
p(s′|1)V (s′,m′)]
]}
.
For an agent of asset m without a job offer (s = 0), the Bellman equation is:
V (s = 0,m) = max
m′
[
u((1− τ)(θ + ω) +m−m′, 1) +∑
s′
p(s′|0)V (s′,m′)]
]
.
Once Bellman equations are solved and optimal decision rules extracted, we can construct
the distribution of agents f(s,m). We then obtain a series of useful aggregate statistics. The
number of workers, for example, is
L =
∫
m
f(1,m)x(1,m)dm. (5)
The number of voluntary unemployed is thus
UV =
∫
m
f(1,m)[1− x(1,m)]dm. (6)
The number of involuntarily unemployed is simply UI = p(0|1) + p(0|0). Hence the govern-
ment’s budget constraint can be written as
τ [L+ ω + θ(piUV + UI)] = ω + θ(piUV + UI) + λ(1− L). (7)
In the sections to come, we investigate separately the optimal UI policy and the optimal
UBI policy for calibrations of the model to the United States at two different time periods.
We then turn to the optimal mix of UI and UBI.
2 Solution technique and equilibrium definition
Solving the agents’ problem implies finding, for every possible level of assets and lottery
outcome, the optimal labor, consumption, and savings decisions of the agent, as well as the
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value function V (s,m). Since there is no closed-form solution for the problem just displayed,
we use numerical methods. After properly parametrizing the model, we make use of the fact
that the value function is a contraction mapping. Applying Banach’s fixed-point theorem
(Kolmogorov & Fomin, 1970), given a policy vector (θ, ω) and a tax rate τ , we iterate on
the value function from an arbitrary starting point. This ensures convergence to the unique
value function that solves the Bellman equation. We then extract optimal decision rules,
given the policy vector, and construct the corresponding stationary distribution of agents,
f ∗(s,m). We then verify if the government balances its budget for the given tax rate. When
needed, we adjust the tax rate and start over until the government budget is balanced.
A steady-state equilibrium in this economy is a choice of labor, consumption, and savings
for every individual at every state of the world (s,m); a distribution of agents over states f ∗;
a policy vector (θ, ω), and a flat tax rate τ , such that (1) all agents maximize their objective
function given the policy vector, (2) the distribution of agents is stationary, and (3) the
government balances its budget.
When assessing the social desirability of a series of policy vectors, we use a utilitarian
social welfare criterion and compare the average value in the steady states corresponding to
each policy vector.
3 Parametrization
To conduct numerical simulations, we need to quantify all model parameters to reflect the
specific conditions of the United States as closely as possible. We do so for two different time
periods: in the 1990s when unemployment risk in the United States was low and in 2011,
when unemployment risk was much higher and more persistent in the aftermath of the 2008
crisis and comparable to some European labor markets. This parametrization enables us to
compare two policies, unemployment insurance (UI) and universal basic income (UBI), in
the context of shocks of very different amplitudes.
We set the length of a period to six weeks, the longest that can accommodate the un-
employment durations of the 1990s, as in Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and Pallage &
Zimmermann (2001), and set the discount factor, β, to 0.995, corresponding to a 4% annual
real interest rate.
The parameters of the utility function are standard in the optimal UI literature. We set
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Table 1: US unemployment statistics
1990 2011
unemployment rate 6% 9%
unemployment duration 12 weeks 36 weeks
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010-2011)
Table 2: Transition probabilities
1990
p(1|0) p(0|0) p(1|1) p(0|1)
0.5 0.5 0.9892 0.06
2011
p(1|0) p(0|0) p(1|1) p(0|1)
0.1667 0.8333 0.9835 0.0165
the risk aversion parameter, γ, to 2.5 and the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure, σ, to 0.67 as in Kydland & Prescott (1982) and Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992).
Since we have normalized a worker’s income to 1, we can interpret all quantitative results
in terms of GDP per worker. We consider that an individual works for 45% of his available
time when employed, as in Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992). The monitoring costs introduced
represent the costs of running the UI agency; while we do not have data for the whole of the
United States, we have a reliable figure for Oregon, a state that exhibits features similar to
the national US labor market (Pallage & Zimmermann, 2010). The cost of monitoring and
administration in that state was $500 per unemployed worker in 2010.5 Based on this figure,
we infer a monitoring cost of λ = 0.0048, i.e., the ratio of $500 and the 2010 US GDP per
employed person, $104,257 (OECD Economic Outlook, 2010). We assume that the relative
monitoring cost is the same in 1990 and 2011.
Shocks in the labor market match the Markov transition probabilities we have computed
using the US unemployment rates and unemployment durations provided in Table 1. The
probability p(1|0) to exit from unemployment — i.e., to receive an offer if previously without
an offer — is the inverse of the average unemployment duration. Using Bayes laws, we can
compute the remaining transition probabilities. Table 2 provides the resulting numbers.
5Computed from data provided by Christina Martin of the Cascade Policy Institute, Portland, Oregon.
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4 Quantitative results
We want to compare the socially optimal universal basic income (UBI) and the socially
optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in 1990 and in 2011 in terms of average welfare. We do
so by comparing steady-state outcomes for various policy parameter values, and we compare
their respective effects on welfare, voluntary unemployment, and asset accumulation.
According to our results (Tables 3 and 4), both policies can make individuals better off
than a self-insurance mechanism (θ = 0 or ω = 0) and are sustainable at relatively low tax
rates.
Table 3 and Figure 1 present the UI results for the 1990 and 2011 United States labor
markets, assuming a success rate of shirkers (pi) of 20%6 and a monitoring cost, λ, of 0.0048
per unemployed person. Based on the average utility of agents in our model of the 2011 labor
market, the optimal replacement ratio in the UI policy is 25%. This number is not far from
the observed coverage once you take into account eligibility requirements. As is standard in
this literature, as the replacement ratio θ increases, average assets diminish and the number
of voluntarily unemployed (shirkers) rises. The optimal replacement rate is higher in 2011
than in 1990, reflecting the higher riskiness of the 2011 labor market (higher unemployment
rate and average unemployment duration). This also implies a stronger tendency for agents
to accumulate assets in the steady state. Average welfare is clearly higher in the less risky
1990 economy.
Table 4 and Figure 2 are the UBI counterparts to Table 3 and Figure 1. Moral hazard is no
longer relevant as every agent in the economy is eligible for UBI benefits whether employed
or unemployed; consequently there is no need to monitor agents and, hence, the monitoring
cost is zero. Our results indicate that the average welfare is maximized in 1990 and 2011
for UBI allowances of, respectively, 1.25% and 2.25% of a worker’s usual labor income. A
UBI program is clearly sustainable, but its socially optimal form implies very small transfers
that are equivalent to a yearly supplement of about $2,000 in 2011, before tax. We do not
observe large numbers of agents quitting employment in the neighborhood of the optimal
UBI policy. But quitters quickly become a problem as the UBI transfer is increased. For a
5% income supplement, for instance, the voluntary unemployment rate would be close to 4%
6It is commonly agreed that 20% is a reasonable number for pi, the proportion of agents refusing job offers
who nevertheless manage to collect UI benefits (Pallage & Zimmermann, 2005). We provide results for other
levels of shirking success in Table 5.
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under both the 1990 and 2011 calibrations. Of course, with fewer agents employed, the tax
rate required to sustain the policy becomes rapidly large and induces more quitting behavior.
Unlike in Van der Linden (2004), the UBI policy thus raises the actual unemployment rate.
The likelihood of quitting rises exponentially in response to increases in UBI benefits.7 This
explains why the socially optimal UBI policy cannot be very generous.
We now want to compare both policies. As previously noted, both UI and UBI programs
are significant improvements over the laissez-faire, i.e., self-insurance shown in the first lines
of Tables 3 and 4. The UBI policy around its optimum may appear as a credible alternative
to UI in both periods. However, for the shirking success probability considered in Table 3
(pi = 0.20) and the monitoring cost calibrated to Oregon, the optimal UI policy is socially
more desirable, as a comparison of average welfare across Tables 3 and 4 suggests. For both
calibrations, UI is clearly a better insurance mechanism against idiosyncratic employment
shocks than UBI, and the inefficiency caused by monitoring costs and cheating behavior
do not offset this fact in our simulations. In fact, for society to switch from UI to UBI
would require a transfer corresponding to 0.02% and 0.18% of consumption in 1990 and
2011, respectively.8 Given the small benefits, such small consumption equivalence numbers
should not be surprising. Indeed, self-insurance can at least partially offset what either of
the policies does not offer through its lack of generosity. Figure 3 gives a good idea of the
respective impacts of UI and UBI on all variables in the 2011 calibration. A similar figure
could be produced for the 1990 calibration with somewhat smaller effects.
Why doesn’t UBI measure up to UI? While proponents of the UBI policy stress the
insurance factor and the reduced administrative and monitoring cost, the main argument
against it has always been that it could significantly reduce the labor supply. We find that
this latter effect is very strong, to the point that UBI in the optimal results barely provides
any transfer and thus provides little insurance. UI is socially preferred because it does
provide insurance — that is, a conditional transfer — and transfers are not “wasted” on
people who do not need them (employed workers). Moral hazard under UI does not seem to
be enough of a problem to overturn this in our calibrations of the US labor market in 1990
and 2011.
7Quitting is not necessarily bad for well-being, as quitters enjoy leisure, but it drives up the tax rate very
fast.
8The transfer is computed as the increase in consumption at all states needed to equate the average value
function under the optimal UBI policy and under the optimal UI policy.
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Of course, it is a standard result in the optimal unemployment insurance literature—as
visible in Table 5—that increased moral hazard drives down the optimal replacement rate.
Similar results were reported by Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992), Wang & Williamson (1996,
2002), Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), and Pallage & Zimmermann (2001). We show here
that society, on average, does dislike moral hazard, but not as much as the implicit free
riding that comes with UBI in our model economies.9 In fact, it would take shirking success
probabilities or monitoring costs substantially larger than our base scenario in Table 3 for
UBI to be socially preferred to UI. Table 5 shows that moral hazard needs to be quite
high in both economies for society to favor UBI (more than 50% of shirkers succeeding
in collecting UI benefits in 2011 and 30% in 1990). Similarly, setting shirking success at
pi = 0.20, Table 6 shows that for monitoring costs in the neighborhood of that calibrated
from Oregon, UI dominates UBI in terms of the average welfare it provides. The table
also shows how monitoring costs affect the average well-being and the degree of optimal
UI generosity, as measured by the replacement ratio θ. We restrict ourselves in Table 6 to
reasonable values of monitoring costs and illustrate their impact on average utility. As we
increase monitoring costs beyond those values, however, we eventually reach a level in which
UBI starts dominating UI on the social preference scale.
In the space of shirking success pi and monitoring costs λ, Figure 4 provides society’s
indifference frontiers between both polices for the job market calibrations of 1990 and 2011.
For every point east of either frontier, UBI is socially preferred to UI for the relevant period.
The higher riskiness of labor markets in 2011 pushes the indifference frontier to the east of
that in 1990. For every level of shirking success, society in 2011 is willing to tolerate higher
monitoring costs to keep its unemployment insurance or, alternatively, for given monitoring
costs, society is willing to tolerate higher levels of shirking success. The switch to UBI
requires more extreme values of shirking success or monitoring costs than in 1990.
We also tested whether a combination of UI and UBI would be socially preferred. It turns
out that the optimal combination of both policies implies UBI transfers of zero. Figure 5
illustrates this for the 2011 calibration. The universal basic income makes it easier for agents
to shirk. In an economy with moral hazard and idiosyncratic shocks, shirking is costly as it
imposes a higher tax burden on those who finance the social policy. The addition of a UBI
9Interestingly, moral hazard is less detrimental for the UI system with large shocks (2011 case) than with
small shocks (1990 case). With large shocks, a UI system is always preferred to a self-insurance system, even
with high moral hazard (see Table 5); with smaller shocks, it is not that definite.
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component to a UI policy thus never improves average welfare for reasonable values of the
parameters. One way to think of why UI so clearly dominates UBI is that UI is simply better
at targeting support where it is needed most. UBI has the major disadvantage of requiring
much higher (distorting) taxes to sustain the same level of support for the needy, while
wasting most of its payments on those with low marginal utility of consumption. Clearly
UBI, even if it is sustainable for the economy, is not a good insurance mechanism against
shocks.
The model economy we consider here is obviously a very crude approximation and could
benefit from some bells and whistles. We want to argue that such additions are not necessary,
as they would only reinforce our results that UI generally dominates UBI. For example,
suppose we add heterogeneity with regard to the employment lottery: some have lower
employability as is typical for lower-skilled workers. These would prefer the targeted help
from UI. The most-skilled workers would prefer UI as well, as they do not need the income
support from UBI (low marginal utility of consumption) and would reduce their labor supply
due to the distorting taxes. Just as in the benchmark case we presented, UBI would end
up contributing very little. UBI would help those who cannot work at all. But it is easy to
argue that they would be better helped with a program specifically addressing this inability
to work, as is the case in many countries.
One could also argue that our UI policy is oversimplified. For example, almost every
UI system in the world has a finite eligibility period or a cap for unemployment generosity.
Even when unemployed, one has to satisfy some additional criteria to qualify. And the level
of benefits is often adjustable to the needs of the claimant, such as the family situation or
capacity to overcome an unemployment spell, through the means of an asset test. Adding
all these features would enhance the targeting ability of UI and thus increase its advantage
over UBI.
We should note that in countries in which it is difficult for the unemployment agency
to distinguish between quits and lay-offs, moral hazard is likely much higher than in the
base scenario considered here for the United States. In such case, the relevant value for pi is
closer to 1. As Figure 4 shows, UBI may dominate UI policies in such a scenario. A relevant
example may be Brazil according to Barros et al. (1999).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a quantitative comparison of an optimal universal basic income
policy and an optimal unemployment insurance program in an economy with idiosyncratic
shocks. While an unemployment insurance program is better equipped to respond to em-
ployment shocks, it suffers from moral hazard and is costly to manage. Monitoring costs are
not trivial and add to the social cost of administering the policy. So does moral hazard, by
allowing a fraction of agents to abuse the unemployment insurance program. A universal
basic income policy, however, has no such social costs and is very simple to manage.
We test the conjecture that a universal basic income may, under moral hazard and in the
presence of monitoring costs, perform better. We conduct a wide variety of experiments and
compare the social desirability of these policies.
Our results show that an optimal UBI is feasible. Nevertheless, the UI policy is socially
robust to the introduction of UBI in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. It takes empirically
implausible monitoring costs and shirking success probabilities for the optimal basic income
policy to dominate in terms of welfare the unemployment insurance policy in the economy
calibrated to the 2011 United States labor market. With idiosyncratic shocks of smaller
amplitude (such as those characterizing the 1990 US labor market dynamics), UBI may
represent a more reasonable alternative, even if the UI policy remains socially preferred.
The superiority of UI is anchored in its ability to help those who are most in need. Even
a very crude UI system with no asset tests and indefinite eligibility is able to easily beat
UBI, which distributes funds blindly and must be financed through distortionary taxation.
Of course, this paper limits the study of universal basic income to its comparison with a
UI policy in a particular model. It does not claim to have the last word on UBI systems.
Other paths could be explored. We could consider different skills among the population; in
this case we have argued that UBI is likely to reinforce the dominance of UI. One could study
the impact of transitions. Indeed, we have only compared steady states so far. Transitions
can induce large costs in the short-term that can outweigh long-term advantages. Given that
the status quo in industrialized countries is typically a UI policy, it is very unlikely that a
transition to UBI would prove to be beneficial overall.
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Table 3: UI with pi=0.2 and λ=0.0048
1990
θ τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol.unempl. Assets
0 0 -110.7749 0.06 0.0000 2.82
0.05 0.0035 -110.7328 0.06 0 2.20
0.10 0.0070 -110.6931 0.06 0.0091 1.80
0.15* 0.0108 -110.6909 0.06 0.0209 1.46
0.20 0.0151 -110.7360 0.06 0.0352 1.16
0.25 0.0200 -110.8332 0.06 0.0518 0.91
0.30 0.0256 -110.9870 0.06 0.0697 0.68
0.35 0.0318 -111.1998 0.06 0.0890 0.50
0.40 0.0386 -111.4552 0.06 0.1077 0.36
2011
θ τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol.unempl. Assets
0 0 -112.8519 0.09 0.0000 7.27
0.05 0.0054 -112.6159 0.09 0.0023 5.31
0.10 0.0107 -112.3922 0.09 0.0111 4.12
0.15 0.0163 -112.2290 0.09 0.0226 3.16
0.20 0.0225 -112.1350 0.09 0.0370 2.36
0.25* 0.0292 -112.0963 0.09 0.0519 1.70
0.30 0.0366 -112.1332 0.09 0.0689 1.16
0.35 0.0449 -112.2727 0.09 0.0887 0.72
0.40 0.0541 -112.4968 0.09 0.1097 0.39
Note: In the table, average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady state
corresponding to the given UI policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. The
socially optimal UI replacement ratio, θ, is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’
decisions.
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Table 4: Universal Basic Income
1990
ω τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol.unempl. Assets
0 0 -110.7749 0.06 0.0000 2.82
0.01 0.0105 -110.7585 0.06 0.0000 2.61
0.0125* 0.0131 -110.7581 0.06 0.0018 2.58
0.0150 0.0158 -110.7596 0.06 0.0039 2.55
0.0175 0.0184 -110.7629 0.06 0.0064 2.52
0.02 0.0210 -110.7647 0.06 0.0077 2.49
0.03 0.0315 -110.7921 0.06 0.0168 2.37
0.05 0.0526 -110.9219 0.06 0.0396 2.15
0.10 0.1073 -111.7223 0.06 0.1078 1.68
0.20 0.2249 -115.6647 0.06 0.2507 1.00
0.30 0.3569 -124.6774 0.06 0.3994 0.53
2011
ω τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol.unempl. Assets
0 0 -112.8519 0.09 0.0000 7.2739
0.01 0.0109 -112.7925 0.09 0.0022 6.59
0.0125 0.0136 -112.7834 0.09 0.0035 6.49
0.0150 0.0163 -112.7774 0.09 0.0057 6.39
0.0175 0.0190 -112.7705 0.09 0.0066 6.29
0.02 0.0217 -112.7689 0.09 0.0093 6.20
0.0225* 0.0244 -112.7626 0.09 0.0102 6.11
0.0250 0.0271 -112.7669 0.09 0.0134 6.02
0.0275 0.0298 -112.7633 0.09 0.0143 5.93
0.03 0.0325 -112.7714 0.09 0.0179 5.84
0.05 0.0541 -112.8397 0.09 0.0360 5.21
0.10 0.1100 -113.5896 0.09 0.1011 3.90
0.20 0.2305 -117.7240 0.09 0.2422 2.08
0.30 0.3639 -126.9929 0.09 0.3856 0.95
Note: In the table, average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady state
corresponding to the given UBI policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. The
socially optimal UBI, ω, is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’ decisions.
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Figure 3:
Table 5: Policy comparisons for different levels of shirking success, with λ = 0.0048
1990
θ or ω τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol. unempl. Assets
Opt UBI 0.0125 0.0131 -110.7581 0.06 0.0018 2.58
Opt UI (pi=0) 0.70 0.0431 -110.0127 0.06 0 0.00
Opt UI (pi=0.1) 0.30 0.0206 -110.5311 0.06 0.0259 0.72
Opt UI (pi=0.2) 0.15 0.0108 -110.6909 0.06 0.0209 1.46
Opt UI (pi=0.3) 0.05 0.0036 -110.7456 0.06 0.0043 2.20
Opt UI (pi=0.5) 0.0250 0.0019 -110.7765 0.06 0.0019 2.44
Opt UI (pi=1) 0.01 0.0009 -110.7952 0.06 0 2.61
Self-insurance n.a. 0 -110.7749 0.06 0 2.82
2011
θ or ω τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol. unempl. Assets
Opt UBI 0.0225 0.0244 -112.7626 0.09 0.0102 6.11
Opt UI (pi=0) 0.65 0.0608 -110.2378 0.09 0 0
Opt UI (pi=0.1) 0.55 0.0608 -111.2316 0.09 0.0716 0.25
Opt UI (pi=0.2) 0.25 0.0292 -112.0963 0.09 0.0519 1.70
Opt UI (pi=0.3) 0.15 0.0180 -112.4240 0.09 0.0405 3.12
Opt UI (pi=0.5) 0.0750 0.0093 -112.6666 0.09 0.0260 4.64
Opt UI (pi=1) 0.02 0.0027 -112.8323 0.09 0.0093 6.24
Self-insurance n.a. 0 -112.8519 0.09 0 7.27
Note: Self-insurance represents the case without UBI and without an unemployment insurance system, ω = θ = 0.
21
Table 6: Policy comparisons for different levels of monitoring costs with pi=0.20
1990
θ or ω τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol. unempl. Assets
Opt UBI 0.0125 0.0131 -110.7581 0.06 0.0018 2.58
Opt UI (λ=0) 0.15 0.0104 -110.6402 0.06 0.0209 1.46
Opt UI (λ=0.001) 0.15 0.0105 -110.6529 0.06 0.0209 1.46
Opt UI (λ=0.0048) 0.15 0.0108 -110.6909 0.06 0.0209 1.46
Opt UI (λ=0.01) 0.10 0.0073 -110.7393 0.06 0.0091 1.20
Self-insurance n.a. 0 -110.7749 0.06 0 2.82
2011
θ or ω τ Welfare Inv.unempl Vol. unempl. Assets
Opt UBI 0.0225 0.0244 -112.7626 0.09 0.0102 6.11
Opt UI (λ=0) 0.25 0.0284 -112.0027 0.09 0.0521 1.70
Opt UI (λ=0.001) 0.25 0.0286 -112.0226 0.09 0.0521 1.70
Opt UI (λ=0.0048) 0.25 0.0292 -112.0963 0.09 0.0519 1.70
Opt UI (λ=0.01) 0.25 0.0300 -112.1992 0.09 0.0517 1.70
Self-insurance n.a. 0 -112.8519 0.09 0 7.27
Note: Self-insurance represents the case without UBI and without an unemployment insurance system, ω = θ = 0.
22
Figure 4: UI versus UBI, 1990 and 2011
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